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Abstract. This paper examines Aristotle’s analysis of unenacted capacities to show the 
role they play in his discovery of the concept of actuality. I first argue that Aristotle 
begins Metaphysics IX by focusing on active and passive capacities, after which I 
discuss Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians, the philosophers who maintain 
that a capacity is present only insofar as it is being enacted. Using Heidegger’s 
interpretation as a guide, I show that Aristotle’s rejection of the Megarian position leads 
him to propose that presence cannot be confined to activity. I also argue that this 
provides the context for Aristotle to realize that the relation between capacity and 
activity can be generalized as the relation between two ways of being. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to examine Aristotle’s analysis of unenacted 
capacities to show the role they play in his discovery of the concept of actuality. I 
first argue that Aristotle begins Metaphysics IX with a discussion of active and 
passive capacities and that he understands activity as their mutual enactment. I then 
examine Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians, the philosophers according 
to whom a capacity is present only in the course of an activity. I show that 
Aristotle’s rejection of the Megarian position leads him to widen the scope of 
presence to incorporate inactivity as a way of being present and that this provides 
the context for Aristotle to realize that the relation between capacity and activity 
can be conceptualized as the two ways in which anything can be said to exist.  
The paper opens with an analysis of what Aristotle calls the “less useful” 
senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, which I translate as “capacity” and “activity.” I 
show that Aristotle understands capacity as the enabling condition of an action or 
passion and activity as the mutual enactment of these capacities. I then examine the 
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view held by the Megarians, the philosophers who maintain that a capacity exists 
only insofar as it is being enacted, that is to say, only in the course of an activity. 
My discussion here relies heavily on Heidegger’s interpretation of Metaphysics IX. 
In Heidegger’s view, the Megarians maintain that a capacity is present if it is 
enacted, whereas Aristotle maintains that a capacity is present if it is possessed 
(according to Aristotle, for example, a builder does not cease to be a builder while 
resting). This “having,” Heidegger argues, is a form of being present, even though 
it is a form of being present that the Megarians fail to realize. 
Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarian philosophers also includes a 
discussion of the ontological status of perception. Here, too, there is an agent (the 
perceptible object) and a patient (the perceiver). And just as the builder retains his 
capacity to build while resting, the perceptible object retains its capacity to act even 
during inactivity, that is to say, even when unperceived. Once again, then, this 
demonstrates the necessity for the kind of presence that need not be confined to 
activity, the kind of presence that the Megarians deny is possible.  
The final objective of the paper is to use the interpretations advanced by 
Heidegger and Stephen Menn to discuss Aristotle’s transition from the activity sense of 
ἐνέργεια to the actuality sense of the term. As we shall see, when the question 
concerning the ontological status of unenacted capacities forces Aristotle to widen the 
scope of presence to incorporate inactivity as a way of being present, Aristotle comes 
to realize that the relation that obtains between capacity and activity can be generalized 
as the ways in which anything can be said to exist. Namely, some things are said to 
exist in the manner of capacity, whereas others are said to exist in the manner of 
activity. What Aristotle comes to realize, I will argue, is that the relation between 
activity and its enabling condition can be generalized into any kind of presence and its 
enabling condition, the latter of which correspond to the two ways of being, which 
Heidegger and Menn identify specifically as an Aristotelian discovery. 
2. CAPACITY AND ACTIVITY 
The central books of the Metaphysics treat the four general senses of being,
1
 
and the ninth book of this work is devoted to an analysis of being in the manner of 
δύναμις and ἐνέργεια.2 These terms are often translated as potentiality and 
actuality, but since their meaning is precisely what is at stake, let us leave them 
untranslated for now. In Metaphysics IX, Aristotle first examines what he calls the 
 
1 The four general senses of being are (i) accidental being, (ii) being as said of the categories, 
(iii) being in the sense of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, and (iv) being as truth; see, for example, Metaphysics 
V.7, 1017a7–1017b9 and VI.2, 1026a33–1026b2. See also Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being 
in Aristotle, 6–8/3–5, and Heidegger, GA 33: 11–18/8–14 (in quoting Brentano and Heidegger, I cite 
the page numbers of the German text followed by the page numbers of the English translation). 
2 Note, however, that being as truth makes a reappearance at the end of Metaphysics IX. It is 
usually maintained that while Metaphysics VI.4 treats the truth of composites, Metaphysics IX.10 
treats the truth of simples. For Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of truth, see 
especially GA 31: 73–109/51–76. 
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“kinetic” senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, adding that these are “not the most 
useful” (οὐ χρησιμωτάτη) for our present purposes, because our chief goal is to 
acquire an understanding of the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that “extend further than the 
mere sphere of motion” (Met. IX.1, 1045b36–1046a2).3 While commentators 
seldom agree on the interpretation of book IX,
4
 they agree minimally that Aristotle 
is trying to distinguish between the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in respect of motion and 
the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that extend further, whatever these expressions may turn 
out to mean. More precisely, most commentators maintain that the Aristotelian text 
involves a distinction between (i) the δύναμις in respect of motion, (ii) the ἐνέργεια 
in respect of motion, (iii) the δύναμις that extends further, and (iv) the ἐνέργεια that 
extends further.
5
 In a seminal paper that I think contains many important insights, 
Stephen Menn refers to (i) as “capacity,” (ii) as “activity,” (iii) as “potentiality,” 
and (iv) as “actuality” (“The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια: Ἐνέργεια 
and Δύναµις,” henceforth “Origins”). Because I will also adopt this terminology, it 
is important for us to gain a precise understanding of these terms. 
Let us begin our analysis with a discussion of capacity and activity. In a nutshell, 
Aristotle explains capacity as the enabling condition (ἀρχή) of an action or of a passion 
and activity as the mutual enactment of these two capacities.
6
 But why does Aristotle 
begin by examining the δύναμις pertaining to the categories of action and passion? 
According to Stephen Menn, it is this kind of δύναμις that Aristotle inherits from past 
philosophers, and especially from Plato (“Origins,” 104–5). What is at issue here are 
the one hand the capacity to do and on the other hand the capacity to suffer, which 
correspond, as the Stranger in the Sophist puts it, to the δύναμις εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν εἴτ᾽ 
εἰς τὸ παθεῖν (247d8–e1).7 For example, the builder has a capacity to effect change on 
the wooden beams, just as the wooden beams have a capacity to undergo the change 
carried out by the builder. Likewise, the teacher has a capacity to teach her students, 
just as the students have a capacity to be taught.  
This raises the question: why does Aristotle identify this kind of δύναμις as 
δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν, in other words, as δύναμις in respect of motion? To phrase 
the question differently, what is “kinetic” about action and passion? A number of 
 
3 For Heidegger’s analysis of the “kinetic” (κατὰ κίνησιν) and the further-extending (ἐπὶ 
πλέον) senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, see GA 33: 49–56/40–46. Note also that for translations of 
Aristotle, I follow Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 
4 One source of disagreement has to do with the relation of book IX to earlier books of the 
Metaphysics; another has to do with the relation between the kinetic and the further-extending senses 
of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. For a discussion of the relation of book IX to earlier books of the 
Metaphysics, see Witt, Ways of Being, 1–4. For a discussion of the argument structure of book IX, see 
Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ, Introduction, §1 and Beere, Doing and Being, 19–29. 
5 Even so, there is much room for disagreement; see, for example, Witt, Ways of Being, 131, n. 1. 
6 As Menn puts it, “[Plato says] that the active and passive powers must always be exercised 
simultaneously. Aristotle builds on this discussion in Plato, but he prefers to say … that the two 
powers have brought into existence a single ἐνέργεια or κίνησις with two aspects (like the road from 
Athens to Thebes, that may be considered from either direction)” (“Origins,” 110). See also note 11 
below. 
7 For Heidegger’s reading of this Sophist passage, see GA 19: 474–76/328–30. 
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commentators adopt an interpretation that I believe sheds light on this question. For 
example, Aquinas argues in his commentary on the Metaphysics for the identity of 
motion to action and passion: “For there is some subject of each of them, namely, 
of quality, quantity, when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both 
action and being acted upon” (In VII Metaphysicorum, lect. 3, n. 1315). Elsewhere 
he writes, “For it is clear that both action and passion are motion; for each is the 
same as motion” (In III Physicorum, lect. 5, n. 310). Similarly, according to 
Brentano (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 133/87), motion is at least 
factually identical to the categories of action and passion (reell identisch mit einem 
ποιεῖν sowohl als πάσχειν). Stephen Menn adds the following: 
We can best interpret Aristotle’s analogy [in Metaphysics IX.6] between 
κίνησις and οὐσία if we recognize that κίνησις, like οὐσία, is the name of a 
category: although it is not on the canonical list of categories in the 
Categories, Aristotle clearly refers to a category of κίνησις in Metaphysics 
1029b22–25, 1054a4–6, 1069a21–22, and 1071al–2: this is what is elsewhere 
divided into the categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. (“Origins,” 107) 
The idea here is that there are several passages in Aristotle’s works that treat 
κίνησις as one of the categories. What is more, there are yet other passages that 
divide κίνησις into κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι, thus drawing a distinction between the 
active and the passive forms of the verb. In one such passage, Aristotle writes: “For 
being, as we have divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now 
quality, now quantity, now time, and again some of it consists in κινεῖσθαι and 
κινεῖν (Eudemian Ethics I.8, 1217b27–29).8 What can we conclude from these? 
The fact (i) that there are several passages that include κίνησις among the 
categories, (ii) that there are yet others that include κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι, and (iii) 
that in none of these passages κίνησις, κινεῖν, or κινεῖσθαι coexist with the 
categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν lend support to the line of commentary according 
to which κίνησις is used as a joint name for the categories of action and passion.9 
Another virtue of this line of interpretation is that it is consistent with Aristotle’s 
own statement that there is no motion of the doer (ποιοῦν) or the sufferer (πάσχον) 
because there is no motion of motion (Met. XI.12, 1068a8–16).10 
In sum, what Aristotle has in mind with the phrase “δύναμις in respect of 
motion” is simply the kind of δύναμις that serves as the enabling condition for 
 
8 The bifurcation of κίνησις into κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι can also be found in other passages. In 
Metaphysics IX.6, for example, Aristotle mentions κίνησις in 1048a25 and κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι in 
1048a28–29. 
9 For a thorough exploration of these issues, see Menn, “Origins,” where the bifurcation of 
κίνησις into ποιεῖν and πάσχειν (or into κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι) is discussed in further detail. 
10 Note also that this interpretation is not inconsistent with the idea that there are four motions 
(generation/corruption, alteration, growth/diminution, locomotion) that in turn pertain to four 
different categories (substance, quality, quantity, place). The categories just mentioned are those 
where the effect of the motion is felt—which effect is felt precisely because the joint activity of action 
and passion gives rise to a change in one of these four categories. 
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some action or the enabling condition for some passion. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the subsequent text rephrases this kind of δύναμις as δύναμις τοῦ 
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. I will refer to these simply as active and passive capacities: the 
capacity to do something or the capacity to undergo something. Insofar as we 
understand capacity as the kind of δύναμις pertaining to the categories of action 
and passion, its corresponding ἐνέργεια is to be understood as the enactment of 
these capacities. For example, the currently inactive teacher has a capacity for 
teaching, and if she begins teaching her students, this would mean that the formerly 
dormant capacity is now being enacted. Similarly, the students have a capacity for 
being taught, a capacity that they retain even when they are asleep or engaged in 
some other activity, but if at one point they go to class and pay attention to their 
teacher, what is at issue would be the enactment of a capacity that was latent 
earlier. Simply put, capacity is the δύναμις for some doing or suffering, while 
activity is the enactment of these capacities. 
Here, however, one may rightly wonder whether there is a sense in which the 
distinction between action and passion is merely a matter of perspective. This is an 
interesting question to consider because it is not as if there are two different things 
going on, for example, when the teacher is teaching and the students are being 
taught.
11
 Similarly, when we say that the builder is building or that the wooden beams 
are being built, what is under discussion are simply two different explanations of 
the same process from opposite poles. But note the following: the capacity to do is 
in each case a different capacity from the capacity to undergo (for otherwise it 
would be the same thing to be a teacher and a student), even though the 
corresponding activity is one and the same. If so, a capacity is either a δύναμις for 
some action or a δύναμις for some passion, which are not identical to each other, 
whereas an activity (in other words, the ἐνέργεια κατὰ κίνησιν) is the joint and 
simultaneous exercise of these capacities. 
It need not take much effort, then, to realize that there is a disanalogy 
between activity and capacity: namely, whereas there is one activity, there are two 
related capacities. One capacity is in the builder; the other is in that which is built.
12
 
The activity, once again, is the mutual enactment of these capacities, namely, the 
mutual enactment of the capacity for action and the capacity for passion. For 
example, the builder has a capacity to effect change on the wooden beams, just as 
the wooden beams have a capacity to undergo the change carried out by the 
builder, yet their enactment is one and the same: the activity of building. In other 
 
11 Anton Ford claims that “action and passion are two aspects of a single material reality, a 
transaction between the agent and patient” (“Action and Passion,” 15). As Mary L. Gill puts it, 
“Action and passion are one in the way that the road from Athens to Thebes and the road from Thebes 
to Athens are one” (Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity, 205). It is worth to point out that 
the Aristotelian passage that Gill refers to is Physics III.3, 202a18–21, which in turn bears 
considerable resemblance to Heraclitus Fr. 60 (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή). 
12 Note that these correspond, respectively, to the causa efficiens and the causa materialis. 
 Hikmet Unlu 6 130 
words, whereas the capacity to build and the capacity to be built are separate 
capacities, their activity is mutual and identical. 
Obvious as this may seem, the distinction between capacity and activity was 
not universally adopted. The Aristotelian text tells us that the Megarian philosophers 
objected to such a distinction, arguing instead that a capacity is present only in the 
course of activity, in which case, for instance, the builder can build only when he is 
currently engaged in the process of building (1046b29–32).13 If so, there would be 
no distinction between “can do” and “is doing,” just as there would be no distinction 
between “can suffer” and “is suffering.” Aristotle says that there is a distinction 
between “can do” and “is doing,” and likewise a distinction between “can suffer” 
and “is suffering,” in such a way that the former (“can do” and “can suffer”) can be 
present even when the latter (“is doing” and “is suffering”) are absent. For 
example, the builder may be not building but rather resting, yet still – i.e., even 
now, when the builder is resting – he can build. This would entail for such cases 
that there is a capacity, that is to say, that a capacity is present. However, this would be 
another way of saying that being present is not confined to being in activity, that a 
thing can be present even when remaining inactive.
14
 Does the concept of inactive 
presence involve a contradiction in terms? This is what is at stake in the Aristotelian 
text under discussion. In what follows, we will take a closer look at this question in 
light of Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarian 
philosophers. 
3. THE MEGARIAN VIEW 
What is the ontological status of a capacity that is not currently being 
enacted? Aristotle suggests that the Megarian philosophers deny “absence” as a 
way of being and argue instead that something “is” only insofar as it is present 
(1046b29–32). According to Aristotle, on the other hand, there may be different 
ways in which something can be absent, and in fact his unstated thesis is that the 
Megarians fail to distinguish sufficiently between the different ways in which 
something can be absent. Heidegger understands Aristotle as arguing that we must 
 
13 It is important to stress that I use the word “presence” without its temporal connotations. 
Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of presence, although important and very interesting, is too vast a 
subject to cover adequately in the confines of this paper. For a good discussion of this issue, see 
Francisco J. Gonzalez, “Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger’s Interpretation of Energeia and 
Dunamis in Aristotle,” according to whom Heidegger is wrong to ascribe to Plato and Aristotle a 
metaphysics of presence, and Joseph P. Carter, “Heidegger’s Sein zum Tode as Radicalization of 
Aristotle’s Definition of Kinêsis,” according to whom Gonzalez “misses the nuances of Heidegger’s 
arguments” (498). 
14 As Nahum Brown puts it, “Heidegger states explicitly that Aristotle’s task at [Metaphysics] 
9.3 is to understand the actuality of disengagement, in effect, to come to terms with an actuality that is 
not at work, a stillness, a silence, an inactivity” (“Aristotle and Heidegger: Potentiality in Excess of 
Actuality,” 206). 
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distinguish between the qualified and unqualified forms of absence, that a qualified 
form of absence cannot be interpreted as “pure negation.”15 The absence of the 
enactment of a capacity is a qualified form of absence that cannot be construed as 
pure negation, for although the enactment may be absent, this would not change the 
fact something is actual nevertheless as a dormant capacity.
16
 The builder retains 
his capacity to build houses even when he is not currently engaged in the process 
of building. In other words, the builder would possess the capacity for building 
houses even while resting, for a mere cessation of the practice of his art would not 
entail the loss of the art.
17
 
This, then, is the crux of Aristotle’s rejoinder to the Megarian philosophers. 
Aristotle claims, namely, that the Megarians fail to come to terms with the 
impossible consequences of identifying cessation with loss.
18
 As he puts it: 
There are some who say, as the Megaric school does, that a thing can act only 
when it is acting, and when it is not acting it cannot act, e.g., he who is not 
building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so 
in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view. For 
it is clear that on this view a man will not be a builder unless he is building (for 
to be a builder is to be able to build), and so with the other arts. If, then, it is 
impossible to have such arts if one has not at some time learnt and acquired 
them, and it is then impossible not to have them if one has not sometime lost 
them (either by forgetfulness or by some accident or by time . . . ), a man will 
not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet he may immediately 
build again; how then will he have got the art? (1046b29–1047a4) 
Let us try to unpack Aristotle’s argument. Assume, for example, that a 
builder has been building for a couple of hours and that he is currently taking a few 
minutes off. Now, even after such a brief period of rest, how can he return to the 
practice of his trade, if the cessation of the practice of the art would thereby entail 
the loss of the art? Clearly, Aristotle thinks, cessation and loss are different, the 
latter of which is also possible but is no trivial thing. According to Aristotle, the 
loss of the art is possible if, say, the builder’s capacity to build houses is hampered 
 
15 To put it in Heidegger’s words, “The Megarians comprehend the ‘non’ as pure negation 
[bloße Negation]—rather than as a distinctive privation [eigentümliche Privation]” (GA 33: 210/180). 
What Heidegger has in mind is the privation of activity, but the same can be said about matter, where 
what is at issue is the privation of substantial form. For further discussion, see Unlu, “Aristotle on 
Ontological Priority,” 141ff. 
16 As Heidegger puts it, an unenacted capacity is already “actual, even though not enacted” 
(GA 33: 173/149). Note that I translate Vermögen (both here and elsewhere) as “capacity” (instead of 
“capability”), which is my only deviance from the English translation of the work by Brogan and 
Warnek.  
17 See GA 33: 182–92/156–65. 
18 For a defense of the Megarian view, see Nicolai Hartmann, “The Megarian and the 
Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of 
Modality.” 
 Hikmet Unlu 8 132 
by decades of inactivity, in which process the (once) builder may have forgot the 
tricks of the trade and may have therefore become unskilled.
19
 However, this is by 
no means and in no way similar to taking a few minutes off, in which case what is 
at issue would not be the loss of the art but a mere cessation of its enactment.
20
  
In Heidegger’s view, the disagreement between Aristotle and the Megarians 
lies in the fact that “the Megarians comprehend the essence of presence too 
narrowly” (GA 33: 185/159). Leaving aside Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of 
the concept of presence,
21
 one of the points that Heidegger is trying to stress is that 
the Megarian philosophers are wrong to confine presence to activity. The Megarians 
are mistaken because ἐνέργεια κατὰ κίνησιν is not the only kind of ἐνέργεια. 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle holds that a capacity is present if it is possessed, 
whereas the Megarians hold that a capacity is present if it is enacted. This “having,” 
Heidegger argues, is a form of being, and is therefore a form of being present, 
although it is a form of being present that the Megarians fail to realize. As he puts it, 
To be capable of something surely means to have the δύναμις, and the 
corresponding not-having implies not being capable. This having and not-
having holds the secret to the actuality and non-actuality of δύναμις. Is having 
thus comprehended as a kind of being? (GA 33: 177/151). 
In Heidegger’s view, the kind of having (ἔχειν) under discussion here is to be 
understood as “having and holding, namely as holding oneself in readiness, holding 
the capacity itself in readiness” (GA 33: 219/188).22 Hence, it is not only activities 
(building, teaching, and so on) that are present. What is also present is what may be 
called being in a certain condition. This is not surprising once we remind ourselves 
that, in one sense of the term, ἔχειν means to be in a particular state and that the 
derived noun ἕξις is often translated simply as “state.” Of course, it is more 
difficult to ascribe presence to a state because, at least on the face of it, it seems as 
if there is nothing “at work” (ἐνεργεῖν) here. Assume, for example, that a person 
has a piece of knowledge that she is not currently putting to use. There seems to be 
no justification to assume that there is a difference between this person who has the 
knowledge and another who lacks it altogether. Since both of these people are 
inactive (by assumption), it is not obvious whether and how we can distinguish 
between them. As has been explained, however, Aristotle insists on the necessity of 
 
19 Aristotle explicitly mentions forgetting (λήθη) as one of the ways in which such 
“unlearning” is possible (1047a1). 
20 Rudolf Bernet writes in the same vein that “since the acquisition (Einübung) of a new 
capacity is so arduous and requires so much effort on our parts, it is certain that once acquired, its 
possession cannot be limited to practicing or exercising it (Ausübung) at some moment or other” 
(“Heidegger on Aristotle: dunamis as Force and Drive,” 64). 
21 See note 13 above. 
22 For Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s concepts of ἔχειν and ἕξις, see especially GA 18:  
172–91/116–29. 
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drawing such a distinction, for any attempt to identify inactivity with unqualified 
absence would lead to impossible conclusions. 
We can now see more clearly what Aristotle believes to be the oversight of 
the Megarian school. The Megarians confine presence to activity, which, however, 
is a wrong move precisely because being in a certain condition is a way of being 
present that is not an activity. For example, there are builders that are currently 
inactive. On the flip side, the wooden beams in the field “have” the correct material 
characteristics for the task at hand without necessarily being in the process of 
undergoing motion. The joint activity of the builder and the wooden beams is 
anchored in qualities that the builder and the wooden beams respectively possess, 
but the cessation of their mutual activity by no means entails the annihilation of the 
qualities in question. Both the inactive builder and the wooden beams at rest 
continue to possess the very qualities that enable them to take part in the activity of 
building. Thus, the mere cessation of some activity would in no way entail the 
destruction of its enabling conditions. In other words, the presence of the enabling 
conditions of an activity is independent of the presence of the activity that emerges 
from these. 
4. THE ONTOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 
Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarian philosophers includes a discussion of 
the question concerning the ontological status of perception. According to Thomas 
Johansen, it “is to strengthen this argument for the presence of [unenacted 
capacities] that Aristotle brings in the sense objects” (Aristotle on the Sense 
Organs, 260).
23
 The analysis of perception pertains to this argument because what 
takes place during the process of building is similar to what takes place during 
perception.
24
 In both cases, there is an agent (the builder or the perceptible object) 
and a patient (the wooden beams or the perceiver). And just as the builder retains 
his capacity to build while resting, the perceptible object retains its capacity to act 
even during inactivity. Once again, then, what is at issue is the kind of presence 
that transcends activity, the kind of presence that the Megarians deny is possible. 
We have already seen that a capacity is present even in the absence of the activity 
that it enables. This brings us to one of the oldest questions in philosophy: does the 
tree that falls in the forest without anyone noticing nevertheless make a sound? In 
Aristotle’s view, there is a sense in which the answer is no; it is only when the 
 
23 Cf. GA 33: 193/166.  
24 There is, of course, one sense in which perceiving is unlike building: in Metaphysics IX.6, 
1048b17–36 and Nicomachean Ethics X.4, 1174a14–23, Aristotle states that there are some activities 
(such as living, perceiving, thinking) that contain their ends within, which stand in contrast to yet 
other activities (such as learning, walking, building) that don’t. Note, however, that the distinction 
between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities, although important, is not pertinent to our present 
concerns. 
 Hikmet Unlu 10 134 
capacity of the agent and that of the patient come together that an activity can take 
place.
25
 In the absence of the patient, the activity would lose one of its enabling 
conditions, in which case the activity would cease to exist. To take another 
example, no perception of red would take place in the absence of a perceiver, for 
the perception of red requires both a thing that acts (the red object) and a thing that 
suffers (the perceiving subject). 
But what happens to the redness of the red object when this object is not 
being perceived? In other words, what can we say about the presence of sensible 
qualities in the absence of the activity of perception? According to the Megarian 
philosophers, Aristotle says, “nothing will be either cold or hot or sweet or perceptible 
at all if people are not perceiving it” (1047a4–6). Aquinas comments that if the 
Megarian view were true, sensible qualities would have existence only when they 
are being sensed (In IX Metaphysicorum, lect. 3, n. 1800). From Aristotle’s 
perspective, the Megarians are wrong precisely because a capacity may be present 
even in the absence of the activity it enables. The presence ascribed to a dormant 
capacity can only be conceptualized as “inactive presence.” According to Aristotle, 
therefore, regardless of whether we are talking about an active capacity (δύναμις 
τοῦ ποιεῖν) or a passive capacity (δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν),26 what is at issue is a 
capacity that continues to exist even when it is not being enacted. This is precisely 
the reason, for example, that the soul cannot be construed as an activity. Different 
kinds of soul enable different kinds of activities: the vegetative soul enables, 
among other things, the digestion of food, just as the sensitive soul enables 
perception and the rational soul enables thinking. But the soul is not dependent on 
the activity that it enables, in the sense that a cessation (or at least a temporary 
cessation) of the activity cannot be identified with the absence of the kind of soul 
that enables this activity. 
Because the Megarians deny the actuality of capacity in general, they are 
forced to deny the presence of the perceptible object and of the perceiving subject 
while no perception is taking place. Let us focus on the former. Heidegger writes 
that the question here is whether there can “be” a perceptible object at all. As he 
puts it: 
What does this call for? Nothing less than such a being which itself and from 
out of itself, prior to all being perceived, is empowered (δυνατόν) to be 
perceived. This perceptible being—that is, a being with the ability to be 
perceived—must “be” as this being with this ability, that is, it must “be” 
actual, if a perceiving and becoming manifest is to occur at all. . . . If the 
Megarian thesis holds, then the actuality of such a being, the perceptible as 
 
25 Cf. Hartmann, “The Megarian and the Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the 
History of the Ontological Problem of Modality,” according to whom Aristotle is confused on this point. 
26 The way we phrase things in English gives the false impression that the perceiver is the 
agent and what is perceived is the patient, whereas for Aristotle the reverse is the case; see, for 
example, De Anima II.11, 424a1. 
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such, is undermined. How so? If the actuality of that which is empowered and 
capable of something lies in its enactment, then the perceptible as such “is” 
actual if and only if and precisely only so long as it is perceived. . . . [The 
Megarians] must in general deny the possibility of a being that is in and of 
itself present, since this can be granted only with the acknowledgement that the 
being present of something that is perceptible does not remain singularly 
dependent upon the enactment of perception. . . . The actuality of what is 
present as the actuality of something self-reliant then still remains intelligible 
only if it can be shown that the actuality of what is perceptible as such does not 
lie in enactment of perception. (GA 33: 200–201/171–72) 
The kind of ontology advanced by the Megarian philosophers force them to a 
theory of mind that is similar to what we would now characterize as 
phenomenalism. What is at stake here is the possibility of the existence of, as 
Heidegger puts it, “beings as they are in themselves, as unperceived, as not formed 
in a perception” (GA 33: 199/171).27 A few pages later, Heidegger adds that “if the 
actuality of that which is capable as such lies in its enactment, and thus if the 
perceptibility of what is perceptible lies in its being perceived, then there would be 
no perceptible being, nothing of the sort that we could also simply represent as 
self-reliant in itself” (GA 33: 204/175). In fact, according to Heidegger, “the 
self-sufficient actuality of what is perceptible” is experienced precisely in its 
“no-longer-enactment and not-yet-enactment” (GA 33: 206/177; emphasis in the 
original). To put this differently, the kind of presence that is not confined to 
activity is most visible in the case of latent capacities. This is why Heidegger says 
of Metaphysics IX.3 that it is “in this chapter [that] we come across the genuine 
preparation for and the grounding of the transition from δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια κατὰ 
κίνησιν to ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις ἐπὶ πλέον” (GA 33: 175/150). In other words, 
Metaphysics IX.3 provides the transition (Übergang) from the more familiar to the 
less familiar senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια because it is the question concerning 
the ontological status of a capacity when this capacity is not being enacted that 
leads us to conceptualize the kind of presence that can incorporate inactivity as a 
way of being present. If so, it is precisely unenacted capacities that facilitate the 
discovery of actuality in contradistinction to activity. In the next section, we will 
take a closer look at the question of what this discovery amounts to. 
5. FROM EΝΈΡΓΕΙΑ AS ACTIVITY TO EΝΈΡΓΕΙΑ AS ACTUALITY 
To retrace the steps already taken in the course of our discussion, ἐνέργεια is 
thought first of all as activity, which is the more familiar sense of the term, but on 
closer inspection it becomes clear that ἐνέργεια cannot be confined to the domain 
 
27 Cf. Heidegger’s discussion of the Ding an sich: “Kant, for instance, speaks of the ‘thing in 
itself’ as something distinct from the ‘thing for us’, that is as ‘appearance’. A thing in itself is 
something that is not accessible to us human beings by way of experience . . .” (GA 41, 5/4). 
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of activity. It becomes clear, in other words, that in order to account for the 
presence of capacities that are not currently being enacted, we need a conception of 
ἐνέργεια that can also incorporate being in a particular state (ἕξις). This corresponds to 
the discovery of the kind of presence that incorporates inactivity as a way of being 
present. But the kind of presence ascribed to a state, which belongs under the 
category of quality,
28
 is quite different from the kind of presence ascribed to an 
activity. In fact, what ties together the two kinds of presence is their analogical 
structure. Activity is to its enabling condition, for example, as a state is to its enabling 
condition. A state is not an activity, but there is a sense in which it resembles one. 
In fact, Aristotle’s novel insight is precisely that “something resembling activity” 
exists in all categories. More precisely, Aristotle’s point is that the relation that 
obtains between capacity and activity can be conceptualized as the “two ways of 
being,” that is to say, the two ways in which anything can be said to exist—namely, 
some things are said to exist in the manner of capacity, whereas others are said to 
exist in the manner of activity. 
It is important to note here that activity is “a” being, whereas being present in 
the manner of activity is a “way” of being.29 In contradistinction to capacity and 
activity, which can be identified as beings (Seiende) in the ordinary sense, we must 
use the terms “potentiality” and “actuality” to signify the two ways in which any 
being can be said to exist. The latter are not beings in the ordinary sense precisely 
because of their transcategorial nature.
30
 Whereas ἐνέργεια in the sense of activity 
is confined to the categories of action and passion, one cannot similarly point out 
the category under which all actualities belong. The actualities from different 
categories are one by analogy (ἕν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν). As Aristotle puts it,  
[W]e must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the 
analogy, – that as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, 
so is the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its 
eyes shut but has sight, and that which is shaped out of the matter to the 
matter, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let actuality be 
defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all 
things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy. 
(1048a36–1048b7) 
Once again, what ties together actualities from different categories is their 
analogical structure: activity is to its enabling condition, for example, as substance 
is to its enabling condition, as quality is to its enabling condition, as quantity is to 
its enabling condition, and so on. In a word, everything that is actual stands in the 
same kind of relation to its enabling condition. Aristotle begins his inquiry with the 
 
28 See, for example, Cat. 8b27. 
29 See also Witt, Ways of Being, 3. 
30 By beings in the ordinary sense, what I have in mind is anything that falls under a single 
category—unlike, for example, “actuality” and “truth.” See also note 1 above for the fourfold division 
of the senses of being. 
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more familiar relation between activity and its enabling condition (i.e., the relation 
between activity and capacity), but then this model is used a stepping-stone to 
develop – arguably for the first time in the history of philosophy – the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality. According to Stephen Menn, for example, whereas the 
capacity-activity distinction “is originally Platonic . . . it is only Aristotle” who 
develops a potentiality-actuality distinction (“Origins,” 104). In a similar vein, 
Heidegger writes the following: 
We broach now the most difficult phenomenon within Greek—and especially 
Aristotelian—ontology: the ὂν δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. Aristotle was the first to 
disclose these characters of Being, and he thereby achieved a fundamental 
advance beyond Platonic ontology. (GA 22: 315/232, n. 1 of the Bröcker 
transcription) 
Despite their differences, Menn and Heidegger would agree that it is the 
question concerning the presence of unenacted capacities that compels Aristotle to 
widen the scope of the concept of ἐνέργεια to incorporate inactivity as a way of 
being present. The teacher has a capacity to teach not only when she is currently 
engaged in the activity of teaching (for this would be needlessly restrictive) but 
rather insofar as she retains a knowledge of the subjects that she had once 
mastered. Similarly, a thing is perceptible not only when it is currently being 
perceived but insofar as it simply “is” as a thing in itself. This allows Aristotle to 
realize that the familiar relation between capacity and activity can be construed as a 
general relation that obtains between two manners in which anything may be said 
to exist, which is another way of saying that any single thing – for example, a 
substance, a quality, a quantity, and so on – exists either in the manner of a capacity 
(exists potentially) or in the manner of an activity (exists actually). As Menn puts it, 
When Aristotle speaks of τὸ ὂν δυνάμει [i.e., being in the manner of a 
capacity], he is not referring back to an already established adverbial sense of 
δυνάμει; he must be referring to some available sense of the noun δύναμις, and 
using the concept of δύναμις to draw out the deeper conception of being 
δυνάμει as a way of being. (“Origins,” 74) 
What Menn says about the relation between capacity (δύναμις) and potentiality 
(τὸ ὂν δυνάμει) can also be said about the relation between activity (ἐνέργεια) and 
actuality (τὸ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ). In fact, Menn’s point is more generally that Aristotle 
exploits the already-familiar senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, using these terms in 
the dative case – as adverbial datives – to qualify being. Hence, it is the familiar 
senses of the terms that enable the “use of these concepts to describe two ways of 
being” (Menn, “Origins,” 89). Menn maintains that this is an Aristotelian discovery, 
that what is at issue here is the discovery of the ways of being. Heidegger holds a 
similar view. As he puts it, 
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And just this exposition of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ πλέον is the decisive, 
basic discovery of the entirety of Aristotelian philosophy; δύναμις and 
ἐνέργεια, taken singularly, obtain for the first time through philosophical 
inquiry an essentially other, higher meaning. (GA 33: 51/42) 
What is being claimed here is that the higher meaning of δύναμις and 
ἐνέργεια, which can be identified as the two ways of being, must be thought of as 
the basic discovery of Aristotelian philosophy, and in Heidegger’s view, it is in 
virtue of this discovery that Aristotle was able to achieve “a fundamental advance 
beyond Platonic ontology.” Regardless of whether Heidegger and Menn are correct 
in identifying potentiality and actuality specifically as an Aristotelian discovery,
31
 
it is evident at least that these correspond to the “more useful” senses of δύναμις 
and ἐνέργεια, whose meanings are unveiled in the course of Metaphysics IX. To 
conclude, let us retrace our steps one last time: when the question concerning the 
ontological status of unenacted capacities forces Aristotle to widen the scope of 
presence to incorporate inactivity as a way of being present, Aristotle comes to 
realize that the relation that obtains between capacity and activity can be 
generalized as the ways in which anything can be said to exist. Aristotle thus 
exploits the more familiar but less useful senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, using 
these terms in a novel way to qualify being, as a result of which they can be 
identified as the two ways of being known as potentiality and actuality. 
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